van Fraassen, Bas

"Science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, not necessarily true."

"The goal of science is not truth but empirical adequacy."

"We can accept a scientific theory without believing it is true."

"Observable phenomena are what matter most in scientific inquiry."

"Empiricism need not require belief in unobservables."

"The history of science shows us that acceptance and belief are different."

"Theories can be instrumentally useful without being literally true."

"We should distinguish between what science says and what we believe about reality."

"Scientific models are tools for prediction and control, not mirrors of reality."

"The underdetermination of theory by data is a fundamental feature of science."

"Observation is theory-laden but observation still constrains theory."

"What we can know is limited by our empirical access to the world."

"Realism about unobservables requires more justification than realism provides."

"The success of science does not entail the truth of our theories."

"We must be careful about what our theories commit us to ontologically."

"Physical theory describes the structure of observable phenomena."

"Empirical adequacy is a modest and defensible goal for science."

"The phenomena are what we can in principle observe and measure."

"A theory can be empirically adequate yet ontologically extravagant."

"Scientific progress does not require convergence to the true theory."

"We can accept scientific theories as useful without metaphysical commitment."

"The relation between theory and evidence is more subtle than naive realism suggests."

"Constructive empiricism offers a reasonable middle path in epistemology."

"Science gives us models that work, not necessarily models that are true."

"The question of what science tells us about reality requires careful analysis."

"Our best theories may be false, but they are empirically successful."

"Observability is relative to our cognitive and physical capacities."

"The interpretation of quantum mechanics remains philosophically open."

"Scientific rationality does not require belief in all consequences of our theories."

"We should distinguish between a theory's truth and its empirical adequacy."