Fodor, Jerry

"The mind is a physical system whose operations are consequential only because of the physical events to which they are correlated."

"Intentionality is the mark of the mental."

"If the mind is physical, then it ought to be possible to explain our mental vocabulary in physical terms."

"The problem of mental content is perhaps the deepest problem in cognitive science."

"Not all mental states are accessible to consciousness."

"Language of thought hypothesis suggests the mind operates in a language-like system."

"Productivity and systematicity of thought require structured representations."

"Mental states can cause physical events, which is the core of the mind-body problem."

"Concepts are not constructed; they are discovered or innately structured."

"The modularity of mind explains how we process complex information efficiently."

"Cognitive science must integrate psychology, linguistics, and philosophy."

"Propositional attitudes are the fundamental units of psychological explanation."

"Folk psychology is our most successful theory of human behavior."

"Mental causation requires that mental properties be causally efficacious."

"The hard problem of consciousness remains unsolved by physicalism alone."

"Semantic properties cannot be reduced to syntactic properties."

"Psychology must remain intentional; purely neurological accounts are incomplete."

"Atomism about concepts captures something important about how minds work."

"The mind-body problem is not merely a problem for philosophers but for science itself."

"Language learning requires innate constraints on what can be learned."

"Psychological laws often admit of ceteris paribus conditions."

"The representational theory of mind is essential for cognitive science."

"Mental content is determined by external causal relations and internal structure."

"Functionalism provides the best framework for understanding mental states."

"Cognitive abilities cannot be explained by behavior alone; we need internal representations."

"The unity of consciousness poses a unique problem for neuroscience."

"Narrow mental content is determined by internal physical states."

"Beliefs and desires are abstract objects, not neural events."

"The explanatory gap between physical processes and consciousness persists."

"Mental representations must have both syntax and semantics."