Fodor, Jerry

"The problem of mental content is arguably the central problem in cognitive science."

"Evolution shaped our minds to represent the world with sufficient accuracy for survival."

"The explanation of mental phenomena requires psychological concepts and laws."

"Consciousness and cognition may require different explanatory frameworks."

"Our thoughts have a logical structure that transcends mere neural activity."

"The mind is an open system affected by environmental and social factors."

"Understanding intentionality is the key to understanding the mind."

"The mind is not a container to be filled, but a fire to be kindled."

"Intentionality is the mark of the mental."

"We are not transparent to ourselves in the way we imagine."

"The computational theory of mind explains how thoughts arise from physical processes."

"Language and thought are deeply intertwined in ways we're only beginning to understand."

"Folk psychology captures something real about how we understand minds."

"The ghost in the machine is not as problematic as Descartes thought."

"Mental content depends on causal relations to the world."

"Narrow content and wide content serve different explanatory purposes."

"The modular mind is both more complex and more systematic than we realize."

"Concepts are not stored as definitions in the mind."

"Naturalism requires us to take seriously the physical basis of thought."

"Psychological generalizations transcend individual differences in implementation."

"The unity of consciousness is harder to explain than most philosophers admit."

"Belief is a relation to a proposition, not a neural state."

"Mental representation is as real as anything else in nature."

"Understanding requires grasping both content and context."

"The private language argument doesn't prove what Wittgenstein thought it proved."

"Evolutionary theory illuminates but does not exhaust human nature."

"We must distinguish between what explains behavior and what behavior expresses."

"Propositional attitudes are fundamental to psychological explanation."

"The mind's modularity explains both its power and its limits."

"Semantic properties supervene on causal histories, not just brain states."