Kripke, Saul

"The historical causal chain constituting the reference of a name extends back to the original baptism or introduction of the term."

"We should not conflate the epistemic question of how we know something with the metaphysical question of whether it is necessary."

"Proper names are conventional in their application, but their reference is determined by non-conventional facts about the world."

"The mind's intentionality depends on facts beyond the boundary of the individual - it is fundamentally relational."

"Identity and distinctness are primitive concepts that cannot be eliminated in favor of descriptions or properties alone."

"The modal operators 'necessarily' and 'possibly' have a clear semantic function once we understand them in terms of possible worlds."

"Facts about possible worlds constrain what counterfactuals are true - not all counterfactuals are equally true."

"The reference-fixing and the meaning-providing can come apart - a description fixes the reference of a term without providing its meaning."

"Essence is not mysterious once we recognize that it is simply what an object has in common across possible worlds in which it exists."

"The debate between internalism and externalism about content is fundamental to understanding both language and mind."

"Natural language reveals metaphysical truths about the world that formal logic alone might obscure."

"Counterfactual reasoning is not merely a linguistic phenomenon but reflects genuine facts about causation and modality."

"The notion that 'could have' marks a genuine modal category, not merely epistemic limitations, is central to sound metaphysics."

"Accessibility relations between possible worlds help us understand the truth conditions of modal claims."

"The rigidity of natural kind terms explains why empirical discoveries can yield a priori knowledge about essences."

"Singular reference is fundamental - the structure of reality includes particulars, not merely abstract properties."

"The explanation of reference cannot appeal only to speaker intentions without reference to communal practices and external facts."

"Possible worlds are not merely conceptual tools but represent genuine metaphysical possibilities."

"The appearance of necessity can be explained by the fixedness of properties across all worlds where an object exists."

"Names and natural kind terms exhibit a kind of transparency to the world that requires a causal-historical semantics."

"Understanding counterfactuals is essential to understanding causation, agency, and moral responsibility."

"The intuition that some properties are more central to an object's identity than others points to genuine facts about essence."

"Philosophy must respect the data of our intuitions about modality while subjecting them to systematic scrutiny."

"The extension of a natural kind term is determined by what shares the inner nature with the paradigmatic examples."

"Descriptive information associated with a name can vary from speaker to speaker without affecting what the name refers to."

"Possible worlds provide a framework for understanding counterfactuals, properties, and propositions systematically."

"The question of what makes a property essential rather than accidental is answered by modal facts about the object."

"Reference-fixing descriptions need not convey the meaning or intension of the terms they help introduce into language."

"The success of referring expressions does not depend on speakers entertaining the complete description traditionally associated with them."

"Modality is not an illusion but reflects genuine structure in reality that semantics must capture."