Kripke, Saul

"The essential properties of gold are discovered, not stipulated"

"Gödel's incompleteness theorems show the limits of formalization"

"We can know necessary truths a posteriori"

"The boat of Theseus problem reveals deep issues about identity"

"Possible worlds semantics captures the logic of necessity and possibility"

"Names are instruments for keeping track of objects across possible worlds"

"Convention plays a role in language, but it is not the whole story"

"The speaker's intention matters for determining reference"

"Ambiguity in language reveals complexity in our concepts"

"We have the ability to think about counterfactual situations"

"Necessity is not mere stipulation or linguistic convention"

"The debate about essentialism cannot be resolved by mere linguistic analysis"

"Existence in some possible world does not entail concrete existence"

"Indexicals like 'I' and 'now' have special semantic properties"

"Context determines the reference of indexical expressions"

"The puzzle of the meter: how do we fix the reference of a standard?"

"Even conventions rest on some non-conventional basis"

"The search for necessary and sufficient conditions often fails"

"Our understanding of necessity requires understanding possible worlds"

"Consciousness and intentionality remain deep mysteries"

"The laws of nature are contingent, not necessary"

"Identity across possible worlds depends on essential properties"

"Counterexamples to analyses often reveal hidden complexity"

"The reference of 'I' depends on who is speaking"

"Epistemic necessity differs fundamentally from metaphysical necessity"

"We must respect the distinction between knowing that and knowing how"

"The causal view explains how names manage to refer despite ignorance"

"Most speakers cannot give a complete analysis of the terms they use"

"Denotation is not determined by properties alone"

"The world itself, not our concepts, determines essential properties"