Lewis, David

"Counterfactual dependence underlies our understanding of causation."

"The plurality of worlds gives us philosophical flexibility."

"Ordinary objects are conventionally carved from the real material."

"We must be careful to distinguish properties from relations."

"Determinism does not eliminate the meaning of causation."

"Intrinsic properties are those that don't depend on other things."

"The mind is not separate from the physical world."

"Convention plays a larger role in meaning than we often admit."

"Abstract objects exist, but they are causally inert."

"Similarity metrics are foundational to understanding properties."

"We should be nominalists about some things but not all."

"Identity is conventional in some contexts, not others."

"The problem of change requires a careful metaphysical analysis."

"Classes are useful fictions, sometimes nothing more."

"Truthmakers explain why propositions are true or false."

"Laws of nature govern what is possible in our world."

"Consciousness may be physical without being reducible to physics."

"Experience supervenes on the physical, but not reductively."

"Qualia are subjective, but they are still part of the natural world."

"The structure of possible worlds is infinite and determinate."

"Mereology is the logic of parts and wholes."

"We carve the world at its joints, not arbitrarily."

"Natural kinds are discovered, not invented by us."

"Convention and nature interact to create the facts we observe."

"Truthbearer semantics must be carefully formulated."

"The analysis of causation requires attention to context."

"Possible worlds are real, abstract, and complete."

"Properties form a hierarchy of fundamentality."

"Identity conditions matter for what counts as an object."

"Supervenience without reduction is metaphysically possible."