van Fraassen, Bas

"We should adopt theories because they work, not because we believe them true."

"The interpretation of quantum mechanics remains underdetermined by the evidence."

"Empirical adequacy requires matching all possible observations, not just actual ones."

"The metaphysical claims of science extend beyond what experience can justify."

"Understanding is primarily about coherence with our experience, not correspondence to reality."

"Scientific theories are successful precisely because they are carefully tailored to experience."

"The value of science lies in its practical applications, not metaphysical truth."

"Skepticism about unobservables need not lead to skepticism about science itself."

"Our best theories may be empirically adequate yet fundamentally mistaken about reality."

"The phenomenal world is the only world we can responsibly claim to know."

"Science gives us increasingly sophisticated maps, not mirrors of reality."

"Constructive empiricism respects both scientific practice and epistemological caution."

"The universe speaks to us only through our experience of it."

"We should be suspicious of theories that claim access to the absolutely real."

"Models and reality are not the same thing; conflating them leads to confusion."

"The success of science is compatible with agnosticism about ultimate reality."

"Experience is the court of final appeal in scientific matters."

"Empirical adequacy is sufficient for accepting a theory in scientific practice."

"The boundary between observation and theory is drawn by pragmatic considerations."

"Scientific method gives us justified theories about experience, not about things-in-themselves."

"We construct increasingly accurate models of phenomena without knowing reality as it is."

"The realist's faith that truth underlies empirical success is ultimately ungrounded."

"Acceptance and belief are distinct: we can accept what we do not believe."

"The apparent objectivity of science arises from shared human experience."

"Understanding science requires distinguishing between its epistemic claims and its metaphysical pretensions."

"The most honest answer about unobservables is often agnosticism."

"Scientific realism mistakes pragmatic success for metaphysical insight."

"Our theories work because they are well-adapted to our experiential niche."

"The debate between different interpretations of quantum mechanics cannot be settled empirically."

"Experience underwrites science, not the reverse."