Philosophy Quotes

"Eliminative materialism gets the philosophy of mind exactly wrong."

"Mental content cannot be determined by internal states alone; the world matters."

"The unity of consciousness poses deep problems for functionalism."

"Folk psychology works remarkably well despite its theoretical shortcomings."

"Compositionality is essential to explaining how finite minds grasp infinite meanings."

"The mind-body problem will not be solved by better neuroscience alone."

"Mental causation seems impossible if physicalism is true, yet we must believe it."

"Qualia may be irreducible to functional or physical properties."

"Propositional attitudes form a coherent psychological kind despite their complexity."

"Intentionality cannot be reduced to brain states without remainder."

"Consciousness is a harder problem than philosophers typically acknowledge."

"Mental representation requires more than mere causal correlation."

"Functionalism cannot account for the phenomenal properties of experience."

"The problem of reference resists simple causal-historical solutions."

"Reductionism about mental properties faces insurmountable difficulties."

"Mental content supervenes on neither internal nor environmental facts alone."

"The explanatory role of propositional attitudes cannot be eliminated."

"Phenomenal consciousness has properties that physical properties lack."

"The privateness of mental states is not incompatible with physicalism."

"Belief attribution requires a normative framework that pure description cannot provide."

"The possibility of zombies shows that consciousness is not entailed by functional organization."

"Mental causation remains a mystery even in a physicalist framework."

"The unity of conscious experience poses a challenge to any modular theory."

"Intentionality is too fundamental a feature to be derivative on function."

"Realism about propositional attitudes is justified by their explanatory power."

"The semantic content of thoughts is partly determined by causal history."

"Phenomenal properties resist functional characterization."

"Consciousness might be multiply realizable yet still pose unique explanatory problems."

"We must distinguish between the metaphysics and epistemology of mind."

"Mental content depends on more than just physical organization."