Fodor, Jerry

"The unity of consciousness poses deep problems for functionalism."

"Thought experiments reveal the limitations of our intuitions about the mind."

"Folk psychology works remarkably well despite its theoretical shortcomings."

"The binding problem remains one of the hardest challenges in cognitive neuroscience."

"Compositionality is essential to explaining how finite minds grasp infinite meanings."

"We should be suspicious of theories that promise to eliminate hard problems."

"The mind-body problem will not be solved by better neuroscience alone."

"Concepts have a kind of structure that resists simple reductionist accounts."

"Abduction is not a form of induction; inference to best explanation is distinct."

"Mental causation seems impossible if physicalism is true, yet we must believe it."

"The frame problem shows that logic alone cannot capture human reasoning."

"Productivity of thought requires compositional semantics."

"We know much less about cognition than we usually assume."

"Qualia may be irreducible to functional or physical properties."

"The hard problem of consciousness has not been adequately addressed by neuroscience."

"Atomism about concepts is inadequate; concepts have internal structure."

"Propositional attitudes form a coherent psychological kind despite their complexity."

"The success of cognitive psychology does not entail that representation is non-mental."

"Information flow in the mind is highly modular and informationally encapsulated."

"Intentionality cannot be reduced to brain states without remainder."

"The semantic content of thoughts depends partly on environmental factors."

"Consciousness is a harder problem than philosophers typically acknowledge."

"Cognitive domains have different principles of organization and computation."

"The architecture of the mind is not continuous with general physics."

"Mental representation requires more than mere causal correlation."

"Thought is massively parallel yet produces serialized output."

"Functionalism cannot account for the phenomenal properties of experience."

"Our understanding of language acquisition remains fundamentally incomplete."

"The problem of reference resists simple causal-historical solutions."

"Cognitive processes are often computationally intractable yet tractable mentally."