Fodor, Jerry

"Reductionism about mental properties faces insurmountable difficulties."

"The nativist position on language is more plausible than empiricism."

"Mental content supervenes on neither internal nor environmental facts alone."

"Artificial intelligence must grapple with the symbol grounding problem."

"The explanatory role of propositional attitudes cannot be eliminated."

"Phenomenal consciousness has properties that physical properties lack."

"We should resist the temptation to trivialize the mind-body problem."

"Cognitive architecture constrains what mental contents are possible."

"The privateness of mental states is not incompatible with physicalism."

"Syntactic operations cannot account for all aspects of semantic understanding."

"The theory-ladenness of observation extends even to introspection."

"Mental disorders reveal the complexity of cognitive organization."

"Belief attribution requires a normative framework that pure description cannot provide."

"The explanatory success of folk psychology deserves philosophical respect."

"Concepts are not reducible to sensory templates or prototypes."

"The possibility of zombies shows that consciousness is not entailed by functional organization."

"Cognitive science must integrate insights from psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy."

"The mind exhibits both systematic and heuristic processing."

"Mental causation remains a mystery even in a physicalist framework."

"Language of thought hypothesis explains the systematicity of thought."

"We lack clear understanding of how perception becomes conscious experience."

"The unity of conscious experience poses a challenge to any modular theory."

"Cognitive impenetrability explains why we cannot simply choose to see illusions differently."

"Intentionality is too fundamental a feature to be derivative on function."

"The problem of mental causation is really the problem of downward causation."

"Concepts involve both analytic and synthetic components."

"Realism about propositional attitudes is justified by their explanatory power."

"The hard problem of consciousness requires new conceptual frameworks."

"Cognitive processes are subject to both computational and rational constraints."

"The semantic content of thoughts is partly determined by causal history."