Schaffer, Jonathan

"Time flows, yet physics describes it as a static block—which picture is real?"

"Events are real, but they seem to be nothing over and above objects and properties."

"Universals explain resemblance but seem to exist in no particular place or time."

"Particulars are what's real and concrete, yet they're what we understand least well."

"The debate between presentism and eternalism mirrors the mind-body problem."

"Abstract objects are indispensable to science yet seem metaphysically extravagant."

"Concrete particulars bear properties, but we don't know what bearing consists in."

"Identity is the most fundamental logical relation, yet it remains philosophically puzzling."

"The analytic-synthetic distinction collapsed, but the problems it addressed persist."

"Properties have intrinsic natures, but intrinsicness is defined using properties—circularity!"

"Mereological nihilism is logically consistent but ontologically ridiculous."

"The form-matter distinction is ancient and useful, but we lack its metaphysical underpinning."

"Causation seems to flow forward in time, yet physics allows it to flow backward."

"Objects seem unified, but nothing in physics explains this unity."

"Properties are abstract, yet they must be where objects are to make them the way they are."

"Grounding explains dependence, but dependence was always a matter of metaphysical taste."

"The bundle theory of objects is elegant until you ask what bundles the bundle together."

"Nominalism preserves our intuitions about concreteness but must deny useful abstractions."

"Realism about properties multiplies entities unnecessarily but seems forced by language."

"The four-dimensionalist sees objects as extended in time; the three-dimensionalist sees them as persisting."

"Both views face insurmountable problems—we choose the problems we prefer."

"Causation is fundamental to science yet absent from the laws of physics."

"The laws of nature might be fundamental laws, or they might be derived from more basic facts."

"Necessity is either in the world or merely in our thoughts—tertium non datur, perhaps."

"The actual world is just one possible world among infinitely many."

"Possible worlds are a useful framework, but we must not confuse the map with the territory."

"Properties cluster in highly specific ways that cry out for explanation yet get none."

"The unity of an object is not explained by spatiotemporal contiguity alone."

"Parthood is a relation that seems obvious until you try to define it precisely."

"Composition is relative to our conceptual interests, not a fact about reality itself."