Schaffer, Jonathan

"The problem of material constitution—how one thing can occupy the same space as another—remains unsolved."

"Objects change their properties yet remain the same; this is philosophically scandalous."

"The determinate-determinable distinction helps organize properties but lacks metaphysical grounding."

"Some philosophers deny objects altogether; others deny the void—both positions strain credulity."

"Tropes are particular properties, universal properties are abstract—the divide seems forced."

"We say objects have causal powers, but we don't truly understand what causal powers are."

"The causal powers of a thing seem to constitute its nature, yet we can't define them without circularity."

"Dispositions are causally responsible but seem to be nothing but tendencies to behave."

"The supervenience of the mental on the physical is widely accepted but deeply mysterious."

"Fundamental particles are fundamental because we've chosen them to be so, not by metaphysical necessity."

"Reality has an ultimate nature, but our concepts are too coarse to grasp it."

"Metaphysical puzzles teach us the limits of rational thought more than they teach us about reality."

"Metaphysics is the study of what exists, and existence itself is the fundamental question."

"Objects are the building blocks of reality, not properties or relations alone."

"Priority monism suggests that the whole may be more fundamental than its parts."

"We must reconsider what we take to be basic in our ontological frameworks."

"The structure of reality is often hidden beneath our ordinary assumptions."

"Grounding is the relation that makes some facts dependent on others."

"We rarely question whether our fundamental categories are truly fundamental."

"Reality does not announce its structure; we must discover it through careful thought."

"Causation might be more complex than our intuitive notions suggest."

"The universe's architecture is a philosophical puzzle we are still assembling."

"What we call simple might actually be composed of invisible complexities."

"Existence precedes essence, but what makes something exist at all?"

"The nature of objects raises questions we have barely begun to answer."

"Priority and fundamentality are not the same concept, though we often treat them as such."

"We inherit metaphysical assumptions from our predecessors without always examining them."

"The concrete world demands a metaphysics worthy of its complexity."

"Objects persist through time, but the nature of that persistence remains mysterious."

"Relations between things may be as real and fundamental as the things themselves."